ABSTRACT Random number generators (RNGs) are the foundation of strong security and privacy measures. With an increasing number of smart devices being connected to the Internet, the demand for secure communication will only increase. An important outgrowth of Internet-connected devices is the embedding of sensors. Yet, there remains a paucity of good protocols to provide sensor-based secure RNG seeds. In their raw form, sensor data are a weak source of RNG seeds for two reasons: 1) adversarial controla malicious party gaining control of the sensor and generating a known data sequence and 2) collinearity across sensors-inherent correlated sequences generated because sensors are embedded in the same device. We propose a new seeding technique that leverages sensor data to provide secure seeds for RNG. Given the current proliferation of sensors and Internet-connectivity on smart devices, this technique could increase cybersecurity in a variety of domains, without additional cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
Few pay much attention to the fact that all of our computing devices need to be able to produce random number sequences via random number generation (RNG). RNG is absolutely essential for so many functions in everyday computing, especially in the area of cybersecurity, where it is necessary for computing processes such as encryption and key generation. There are also other facets of computing where RNG become important, such as gaming, where elements of chance are needed, for example, even for something as simple as generating dice rolls for a game of Yahtzee. RNG is also important for computational modeling and simulation of real-world events, in order to explore a range of potential outcomes, for example, weather patterns. However, perfect random number generators are not yet available [1] , [2] . To generate random number sequences, computers rely on algorithms known as ''pseudo-random number generators'' or PRNG. A critical component of the functions and quality of PRNG is ''seeding,'' whereby a number or vector ''seed'' is used to initialize the PRNG to produce a random number sequence. Effectively, if the seed values are known, the entire sequence generated by a PRNG will be known, and the seeding process is a critical point of vulnerability for cybersecurity purposes.
As reviewed by Van Herrewege et al. [3] , if seeded appropriately, PRNG are able to provide a consistent supply of random output, however, if the seeds are poor quality, a predictable output is generated. Simply, weak PRNG outputs will lead to security vulnerabilities, as reflected in this recent article published by the SC Magazine UK (an outlet for IT security professionals) [4] , which is a practical example of how password managers can be affected by weak PRNG output. As a result, there is a continued search for new methods of obtaining high quality seeds that are sufficiently unpredictable, i.e., of sufficient entropy, to be used as a seeds for PRNG.
The importance of sufficiently unpredictable PRNG outputs will only grow, as more items within the home are linked to the ''Internet of Things'' or IoT for example, home security systems and appliances (e.g., Blu-ray player, washer/dryer, etc.). Additionally, with commercial airliners and drones being connected to the internet, more security vulnerabilities are introduced. Similarly, the development of driverless vehicles also pose such as threat, as adversarial control of the aforementioned vehicles, in the air or on the road, could cause significant havoc if their cybersecurity is compromised. In fact, many motor vehicles today already rely on a variety of computer systems for traction control and fuel injection, for example, and are also being connected to the internet, making them vulnerable to cyber-attacks.
With the growth of IoT and connected vehicles comes a growth in the number of embedded sensors. For example, accelerometers are available on virtually all mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets. A growing number of motor vehicles are equipped with a host of different sensors that track lane keeping patterns, detecting forward collisions, and so on. Unfortunately, the continued embedding of an increasing number of sensors on a single device or vehicle leads to its own problems. On the surface, it would seem like having more data streams would provide more random numbers for seeds. On the contrary, because all of the sensors are housed together on the same device, the data streams from the various sensors will be correlated to an extent. This means that if one wanted a designated sensor for this purpose, it would have to be housed outside the device and transmit data across some connection, making that a bad solution. To make the sensor solution workable, correlations between data streams must be broken before the data sequences can be used to seed a PRNG.
In practice, some might hesitate before using the CPU clock for data encryption since the random numbers used for encryption, as CPU clock time might be obtainable, making the seed source vulnerable. One possible alternative would be to leverage the many sensors that are embedded in our computing systems, mobile devices, and even vehicles. There is a problem with using sensors for seeding purposes. Yes, if left idle, the accelerometer would generate a pretty random sequence of numbers due to electrical background noise that exists in any electronic sensor. But, sensors that are embedded in our computing devices are designed to track and obey the commands of a user, not to just sit idle. All a hacker would then need to do is move the sensor through a known sequence of events and the seeds are known. This could be anything moving the device a certain way to changing the temperature, i.e., adversarial control (see also [5] ). In addition, values generated by sensors in a device are available to the operating system, accessible through software Human behavior is both predictable and systematic and is not as noisy or random as people would think [6] , [7] .
There are thus two problems that need to be overcome for sensor data to be utilized as seeds for RNG. First is the risk of adversarial control where ''false data'' with predictable patterns that are known to the cyber-attacker are generated, allowing the RNG sequence to be known by the attacker. Second is the problem of ''collinearity'' or correlated patterns across multiple sensors on the same device. Effectively, knowing the data patterns of one sensor exposes the data of other sensors. Here, a three-step approach that allows the aforementioned problems to be overcome is introduced: 1) by removing the ''true'' data that is being tracked; and 2) eliminating correlations across multiple sensors, in a sense, contaminating the data from one sensor with data from the others. This paper presents an empirical proof-of-concept examination of the potential for sensor data to be used as strong seeds for secure computing.
A. A NEW PROTOCOL FOR OBTAINING SEEDS FROM SENSOR DATA
For the sake of simplicity, the three steps are termed wash, rinse, and spin.
Step 1 -WASH: Clean out and remove the predictable patterns of user or device from the data sequence.
Step 2 -RINSE: Increase unpredictability in the data sequence.
Step 3 -SPIN: The accelerometer data sequence goes into the random number generator as seeds and is ''spun'' into sequence of random numbers with sufficient unpredictability.
Indeed, using a ''cleaning'' analogy might seem misplaced on the surface, as most would consider random or noisy data to be ''dirty'' and more suitable for RNG seeding. However, raw data obtained from sensors are made dirty in terms of usability for RNG seeding, contaminated by blocks of data that contain predictable patterns of user and device behavior.
To test the wash-rinse-spine approach, data were collected from an accelerometer embedded within a smartphone during normal, everyday use. Accelerometer data during normal use are far from random. Every tap on the screen, every movement of the phone and change in orientation are captured and footsteps visibly introduce unwanted predictability into the data sequence. All of these factors make this accelerometer data sequence a weak source of RNG seeds. These behavioral patterns are immediately evident in the raw accelerometer data shown in Fig. 1 . 
B. WASH
At this stage, the main goal is to remove some of the major, slow drifts in the data sequences that would be representative of whatever pattern the sensors are supposed to track. Examples of slow drifts are shown in Fig. 2 . This process minimizes the benefits of adversarial control, as gaining control over the sensor(s) no longer directly affects the RNG. These are the most predictable parts of the sequence as they are our biggest source of predictability. It is important to keep in mind that drift is also natural in electronic sensors, even if untouched, for example due to changes in temperature (see [5] ).
This makes the first step essential in eliminating the bulk of the predictability within the sensor data sequence in order to minimize traces of user or device behavior. A key factor in the effects on user or device behavior, as well as ambient patterns is nonstationarity. Because the data are drifting and moving within a range, the mean and variance of the data sequence will change as a function of time. The easiest method of removing nonstationarity in data sets is to differentiate the data, i.e., obtain its derivative.
For the current data set, the first-order derivative of acceleration, i.e., jerk, is utilized. If the data are highly non-stationary, the differentiation process can be repeated by continually obtaining higher order derivatives until a set threshold for stationarity has been achieved. For example, this can be achieved by continuing to differentiate the data until a test of stationarity such as the KPSS (Kwiatkowski-PhillipsSchmidt-Shin) test [8] has been satisfied. The effects of obtaining the derivative of the data are clear as all that is left are 'pulses' at certain points in the data sequence. What is important to note at this point is that measurements of ''stationarity'' can be utilized to determine whether the average and variance in the data sequence have been stabilized. An example is shown in Fig. 3 . The only potential remaining threat at this stage is that the sensor is somehow forced to reproducing a single value, which is easily rejected when the differenced data continually return zeros as output. 
C. RINSE
After going through the ''wash'' cycle, the data are now much more unpredictable than before. At this point, the data sequence is now more unpredictable than it was initially, but there are still pockets of predictable data patterns. Next comes the rinse cycle. Similar to the laundry, we have now ''removed the dirt,'' and as the next step, the traces of the soap should also be removed. The data now consists of pulses and ''bare spots'' where there little activity is present. The goal of this cycle is to transform the data further so that it becomes a continually random sequence of values.
To protect from additional vulnerabilities, the washrinse-spin method does not manipulate the data directly. Instead, the data into complex numbers using a Fast Fourier Transform for N points, which transforms the data into complex exponentials:
n N Here, the real numbers reflect the magnitude of the sine wave at a given frequency while the imaginary component indicates its phase. To effectively ''scramble'' the data, the imaginary numbers of k are replaced with random values. Once the imaginary exponents have been replaced, the data are converted from the frequency domain into the time domain using an Inverse Fast Fourier Transform.
Visually, the results of the rinse cycle as shown in Fig. 4 are comparable to a 10,000 point data sequence generated with the Mersenne Twister. An 8-bit integer sequence is now available and can be fed into a random number generator as seeds for encryption, password management, etc. 
D. SPIN
This is now the simplest phase of the process. After the ''rinse'' cycle, the seed data sequence can now be broken up and used as seeds for an RNG, for example, the Blum-Blum-Shub [9] , Mersenne Twister [10] , etc. This allows a few seeds to be transformed into larger and longer data streams, providing a consistent, stable, and secure sequence of random numbers.
E. MINIMIZING COLLINEARITY ACROSS MULTIPLE SENSORS
As mentioned earlier, a problem of having multiple sensors on the same device is the risk of collinearity. A good example of this is the similarity across the three axes of motion tracked by the accelerometer, as shown in Fig. 5 . What becomes clear immediately is that the all of the three data sequences are quite strongly correlated. There is a tendency for data patterns to change at the same point in time. To solve this, a linear algebra technique is needed, namely Principal Components Analysis (see [11] for a tutorial). First, a correlation matrix is obtained from the matrix of data vectors (note that a covariance matrix is also a possibility, but this will lead to a situation where the data sequence with the largest magnitude of variance will dominate the overall data pattern). Second, the eigenvectors and eigenvalues are obtained from the covariance matrix. Third, the product of the data matrix and eigenvector matrix is obtained. This process effectively rotates the data onto new basis vectors, where data falling along the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue represents the basis vector where the data matrix is most correlated. Concomitantly, the eigenvector corresponding to the smallest eigenvalue is the basis vector where the sensor data matrix is least correlated. The data sequence that projects onto this basis vector can be extracted to be used in the wash-rinse-spin cycles for seeding, as shown in Fig. 6 . To test the effectiveness of this procedure, the R-values of the correlations of the data matrix are compared with the data sequence projected onto the smallest eigenvector. Only absolute R-values matter, whether the data are positively or negatively correlated is arbitrary; as long as a correlation exists, there is shared information. In its raw form, the average correlation across the three accelerometer axes is 0.35 vs. 0.25 when the data are projected onto the smallest eigenvector.
To test the stability of this approach, we collected 200,000 accelerometer data points across the 3 axes of motion. Overlapping data sequences are created next, each 20,000 in length and moved the window by 1,000 points each time. This gives us a total of 3,620,000 numbers in the final data sequence for a total of 181 data matrices with data vectors of 20,000 points. As shown in Fig. 6 , there is a clear difference with the average R-value across the 181 runs cut down by more than half, going from 0.53 for the raw data to 0.24 once the data are transformed and projected onto a new dimension. A one-way ANOVA demonstrates that the transformation is statistically significant: F(1, 360) = 243.5, p < .000001.
Essentially, this process searches for ''attractors'' and ''repellors'' within a data matrix. The eigenvector approach forces all of the data on dimensions of decreasing covariance/ correlation starting with the basis vector where correlations are greatest and obtaining its orthogonal complements. The smallest eigenvector represents the space where there is the least correlation. This protocol becomes stronger with a greater number of sensors, as it allows a greater proportion of total variance to be taken up by the larger eigenvectors, leaving the smallest eigenvector with only the uncorrelated data. From this perspective, the extracted data will be minimally correlated with any of the original data sequences.
II. SEED QUALITY MEASURED USING THE NIST TEST SUITE
To evaluate the strength of the wash-rinse-spin generated accelerometer seeds against a known standard, the seeds are tested using the suite provided by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) [12] . To do this, the accelerometer in the smartphone was maintained and active in the background, collecting data while the Android phone was used during daily activities. This includes browsing, emailing, texting, as well as being kept in the pocket or bag. The accelerometer sampled at a rate of 100Hz (hundred samples per second) and running this process for approximately halfan-hour yielded 205,595 data points from a single smartphone. For the sake of simplicity, only the initial 200,000 data points obtained from the accelerometer will be subjected to the NIST tests.
Because the smartphone data are being compared against established random number generators (RNG), a sufficient number of analyses on the data become necessary. This prevents the possibility that simply by chance, an RNG performed better or worse than our data sequence. to the data had to be ''expanded'' to allow 200,000 data points to be converted into more data so that repeated tests are possible. To do this, overlapping data sequences, each 20,000 in length with a 1,000 point moving window were created. This gives yielded a total of 3,620,000 numbers in the final data sequence for a total of 181 bitstreams of 20,000 numbers each. This process is similar to the one used to compare the effects of the eigenvector rotation.
It is important to note here that the goal of the NIST testing is to assess the strength/security of the seeds, not the final RNG product. As a result, only the X-axis data that have undergone the wash and rinse cycles, but have not been subjected to the eigenvector rotation is used. As comparisons two widely used RNGs, the Blum-Blum-Shub and the Secure Hash Algorithm (G-SHA1) will be used, both of which are available on the NIST Test Suite. Raw accelerometer data will also be subjected to the NIST tests in order to test the efficacy of wash, rinse, and spin approach. Table 1 shows the % pass rate for a set of key tests in the NIST test suite.
The washed and rinsed output is able to perform fairly close to the Blum-Blum-Shub RNG, and outperforms on Linear Complexity and Block Frequency. The Secure Hash performs far more poorly on all counts, with the exception of Linear Complexity. This table also demonstrates that raw accelerometer data are a poor source of RNG seeds as they were only able to achieve a >90% pass rate on one of the many tests.
A test that had to be examined with greater depth was Approximate Entropy. Unlike all of the other tests that had >85% pass rates, the Approximate Entropy tests dropped to zero. In Table 2 , the Approximate Entropy test results are examined in greater depth, with means standard deviations, and ranges provided. While the G-SHA1 entropy values are about 30% lower than the Blum-Blum-Shub, the wash-rinse seeds are within 3% of the Blum-Blum-Shub seeds, despite not passing the NIST test. Raw accelerometer data are clearly insufficiently random and unreliable, possessing the lowest entropy scores and largest variability across repeated test blocks (see Fig. 7 ).
The Blum-Blum-Shub, in terms of the test outcomes, outperforms the wash-rinse-spin approach. However, it is important to note the Blum-Blum-Shub method in itself requires secure seeds to function appropriately. With the Blum-Blum-Shub method, once the seeds are known, the entire data stream becomes completely predictable. The wash-rinse-spin approach adds additional layers of security by requiring that anyone making malicious attempts to determine the random data stream also have to: A) know the actual sensor output; and B) recreate the wash-and-rinse steps; before even attempting to reproduce the RNG procedure.
Complete results from the NIST Test Suite are available for download: G-SHA1 results, Blum-Blum-Shub results, and Accelerometer results [13] . A complete explanation of the tests and NIST Test Suite functions can be found in [12] .
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Results from the NIST Test Suite indicate that the wash and rinse procedures work to alleviate weaknesses of directly extracting raw sensor data as seeds for RNG. The NIST test suite clearly reveals the inadequacy of using raw sensor data as a source of RNG seeds. Furthermore, the NIST results also confirm the fact that raw sensor data provide fairly weak sources of entropy and are not a good source of secure RNG seeds. In fact, in many ways, the strength of the seeds is comparable to random numbers generated by the Blum-Blum-Shub RNG. Even in terms of entropy, the washed and rinsed accelerometer data were within 3% of the sequences generated by the Blum-Blum-Shub RNG. These tests results show that the wash-rinse approach to generating seeds are within range of being random enough to be used for secure communication, not just serving as seeds for RNGs. These findings demonstrate proof-of-concept of the utility of the wash-rinse-spin method in generating strong seeds that can be used for secure computing.
The wash-rinse-spin solution is especially important given the fact that the ubiquity and pervasiveness of connected devices and sensors leaves users increasingly vulnerable to cyberattacks. Effectively, the wash-rinse-spin solution leverages the abundance of sensor data from multiple devices as a source of security, rather than vulnerability. While this growth in connected devices has greatly increased human productivity, it also creates vulnerabilities. For example, WiFi connected vehicles are exposed to cyberattacks, which in turn will have disastrous consequences for public safety, not just the individual vehicle owners. Similarly, office spaces and homes that have electronically controlled environments, e.g., lighting and temperature control, while environmentally friendly, also exposes data within that office to cyberattacks and data theft. In these cases, a hacker could gain access to sensitive data through the environmental control systems, which share a common internet connection with other computing devices in the living or office space. Additionally, because these sensors are all housed within a common space, their collinearity leaves them vulnerable to hacking, even if data encryption is used.
As demonstrated in the results, the current approach is able to generate sufficiently strong random seeds that are comparable to existing RNG and strong enough to pass some of the tests required by the NIST Test Suite. However, while there is proof-of-concept, some limitations remain. Indeed, this study only uses a single set of empirical data. Additionally, other approaches to data randomization other than complex numbers and FFT are also possible, but would require a separate paper that systematically tests available options and randomization methods. In addition, testing the problem of sensor collinearity would require a separate empirical examination of sensors housed within a single device. There is a path for future research, the current proof-of-concept paper remains necessary as it provided the opportunity to broadly test a small data sample across multiple dimensions before proceeding to more focused testing.
It is important to note that the sensitivity of the sensors will be a factor in the quality of the RNG seeds. Sensors with low levels of sensitivity and/or a small tracking range are unlikely to provide a large enough range of data values to be utilized in the process of generating secure seeds.
It may be difficult but not impossible to invert some of the steps in the process. For example, the rinse cycle is invertible, if the random phase is known, because Fourier Transform is bi-directional. The wash step is a differentiation process. Numerical integration is normally imprecise, especially if the raw sensor sampling rates are variable, which they tend to be. Technically, the wash cycle is not invertible. In fact, with increasing order of the derivative, the original data series gets more difficult and imprecise to reproduce through numerical integration. Overall, the wash-rinse-spin process is practically not invertible.
In summary, the wash-rinse-spin approach has the following advantages. 1) Availability. First off, this method of seeding the random number generator takes advantage of sensor data as an initial source of unpredictability. However, instead of using user behavior alone as seeds, wash-rinse-spin leverages that initial source of unpredictability and removes VOLUME 3, 2015 predictable parts of user behavior and boost unpredictability further. 2) Reliability. Second, this technology is particularly suited for the growth in always-on technology, such as smartwatches (e.g., heart rate data) where a constant stream of data is available. Even if the device is not always on, for example, a smartphone, start-up time would be enough to provide an initial data sequence. While we collected data at only 100Hz, accelerometers are capable of sampling unfiltered data at rates above 1,000Hz, effectively, one data point every millisecond. This would mean that startup time alone would be enough to kick start and seed an RNG. 3) Security. Last, but most important is the security that this protocol provides. If the wash-rinse-spin process is done at the hardware level, e.g., a hardware add-on attached to a sensor or better still, multiple sensors with a unary function of preparing the seeds and generating the random numbers where no software access is provided, hackers can be kept out. 
